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"FORGET POSTMODERNISM:
BRUNO lATOUR'S
NOUSN'AVONSJAMAISErBMODBRNBS"
Given the proliferating literature on postmodernism, one might
think that all the changes on the subject had been runge Such an
assumption would underestimate the creative capacity of French
philosophers. Bruno Latour's Nous n~vons jamais ~t~ modemes: Essai
d~nthropoJogiesymetrique(Paris: Editions la Decouverte, 1991) manages
to turns the discussion inside out by challenging a central assumption
shared by friend and foe of postmodernism alike.
The contemporary conversation between postmodernists,
modernists, and anti-modernists does not simply date back to Lyotard's
Tbe Postmodern Condition (1979, English translation· 1984). Today's
discussants, although they may not realize it, are engaged in a second
generation of reflection on this issue. Several thinkers in the late 1800's
and the early 1900's believed that they were witnessing as momentous a
transition as that from the Middle Ages to Modernity.
Arnold Toynbee, who coined the term, identified the "post-
Modern Age" as beginning with the end of the 19th century, dominated
by the European middle class, and the beginning of the 20th by which
time a large industrial working class had emerged (Toynbee, p. 338).
Nikolai Berdiaev believed that Modernity would be succeeded by a new
Middle Ages (Berdiaev, eh. 2). C.E.M. Joad summarized the climate of
opinion when he declared that "we have come, we feel, to adefinite
break in the tradition of our civilization. The nineteenth century was the
end of an epoch: we, it is increasingly evident, are at the beginning of
another" (Joad, p. 24).
Tbe sentiment of transition was not unique to philosophers. As
the 19th century neared its end, George Bernard Shaw asserted that
Ibsen's A DolJ's House signalIed an important turning point. Nora's
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departure, he claimed, was more "momentous than the cannon ofWater-
loo...for when the patriarch no longer rules, and the 'breadwinner'
acknowledges bis dependence, there is an end to the old order..." (G.B.
Shawt p. 143). The works of Nikos Kazantzakis result from his agonizing
over what it meant to live in a transitional age. eloser to the present,
Walker Percy's novels were premised on the belief that modernity, which
could be called the "Secular Era," had come to an end with the catas-
trophes which marked the first half of the 20th century (Percy, p. 114).
The fascination with endings that occupied these individuals was
often linked to a hopefulness about 'the role of the philosopher in
articulating the transformation into a newepoch. By contrast, the second
half of the 20th century saw the rise of a new generation, influenced by
the critiques of Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger. This newer
generation tends to take a more skeptical view of professional
philosophy's role. Richard Rorty epitomizes the latest stage with his
assurance that post-Enlightenment culture "would contain nobody called
'the philosopher'" (Rorty, p. xxxix). It is these thinkers who usually come
to mind when discussing postmodernism. They begin by rejecting the
Enlightenment project of apodictic knowledge based on pure reason.
Their writings tend to emphasize play, the rejection of absolutes, and the
irrecusable multiplicity of perspectives that mark human life.
Such a view is not universally adopted. The latest generation
also includes those who are reluctant to accept postmodernism. It is still
possible in the late 20th century to find someone who looks longingly and
gratefully not to a Nietzsche, but to a S1. Benedict, as does A1asdair
MacIntyre. Still otherst like Hilary Putnam and Jurgen Habermas wish
simply to reform modernity, not break with i1.
Despite the diversity of positions, the participants in this
conversation share one belief. Together, they can chant the same refrain:
"Modern we once were." Postmodernists add a stanza: "Modern we once
were; postmodern we will become." Opponents of postmodernism add
their own stanzas: "Modern we once were; to the premodern we seek a
return" is one; "Modern we once were; Modern we should remain" is
another. Latour's voice is significant because he wants to alter not the
second, but the frrst stanza. His contribution: deny the central assertion
common to everyone else and claim that "We Have Never Been
Modern."
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At fIrst glance, something seems very wrong with this title. As
we examine the period between the Renaissance and World War I, it
would be hard to claim that there was nothing distinctive about European
civilization. The triu.mph of the subject, the transformation of enchanted
nature into dead matter, colonization, belief in progress, Gali1ean science,
and the Enlightenment mark off European civilization as unique in a way
usually associated with the adjective "Modern." Here is where a
philosophical penchant for distinctions helps Latour. European thinkers
did construct what he calls a modern "Constitution" built around a "great
partition" between humans and nature. This Constitution parcelled out
citizenship into two main categories, "subject" and "object."
In so doing, it organized two different judicial realms, that of
"nature," a material world independent of humans, and that of "culture,"
a social world created by humans. The aim of such a separation was the
creation of two new, distinctly modern, realms. They would be "modern"
because the pre-modern elements of superstition, tradition, myth, and
prejudice would have been eliminated. These "superstitious" elements,
mixing together gods, humans, natural forces and ancestral customs, had
led to overly rigid constraints: belief in a fickle, anthropomorphized
nature on the one hand; and a society suffocating in the closed world of
convention on the o'ther.
The modern Constitution stipulated that citizens were to begin
all inquiries with a ritual cleansing, an eliminative activity Latour names
"purification." Political theorists were not to remain rooted in the
traditions, historical lirnitations, and customs of the past. Their task,
rather, was to construct a political order based on a properly purified
reason. Scientists were not to contaminate themselves by involvement
and participation in nature's processes. The purified view, the key to the
advancement of science, demanded a specific stance toward nature: that
of an objective spectator.
Such, according to Latour, was the modern project, the intel-
lectual field within which, with varying degrees of faithfulness, the philo-
sophers of the modern age played their games. That something üke the
modern Constitution did exist, he does not doubt. What he asks of his
readers, though, is that, instead of paying attention to modernity's rules
and laws, we pay attention to its practices. Here, he argues, we will find
a situation quite unlike the dominant ideology. While purification based
on the bifurcations into subject and object, culture and nature was the
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ideal, the actuality was quite düferent. It was dominated, as human
practice has always been dominated, by the decidedly un-pure, mongre-
lized epistemological outcomes that Latour calls "hybrids" or "quasi-
objects."
Living in the last decades of the 20th century gives us an
advantage for understanding "quasi-objects." More and more we are
confronted with phenomena which do not fit the purist categories of
subject or object, nature Q! culture. Global warming and ozone depletion
are two examples cited by Latour. These result from interactions
between the cultural and the natural. Neither purely "subjective" nor
isolatedly "objective," they are best describe as "hybrids" or "quasi-
objects." This contemporary clue occasions a re-thinking of the entire
epistemological field. Such a re-thinking leads to the recognition of just
how prevalent are "hybrids." Latour gives examples:
Non seulement la pompe ~ air, mais aussi les microbes, 1'~lectricit~,
les atomes, les ~toiles, les ~quations du second d~g~, les automates,
et les robots, les moulins et les pistons, l'inconscient et les
neurotransmetteurs (p. 147).
The sharp spUt between scientists who merely "discover" truths
of nature, and political reformers who "invent" novel social ideas cannot
hold once the modern Constitution is exposed as spurious. Here Latour
echoes a theme that has become part of the intellectuallandscape in the
second part of our century, whether in Gadamerian hermeneutics or post-
Kuhnian philosophyof science. But such themes were familiar also to the
tum-of-the-century generation. Peirce's semiotic with its emphasis on
mediation, and Dewey's insistence on the "accrual" of forms to materials
within inquiry, could, without much difficulty, be retranslated in terms of
"quasi-objects." Pragmatists had already grasped the fact that we live,
have always lived, in what Latour caUs the "1'Empire du milieu" (70)
characterized by pervasive mediation and the proliferation of "hybrids."
If we have never been modern, what are we to make of those
who embrace postmodernity? Latour's answer is that postmodern thin-
kers do litde to challenge the modern Constitution. Indeed, they rein-
force it with an important amendment: the privileging of discourse. Here
too is a purified realm which, following Oe Saussure, exists independently
from reference to external nature. The privileging of discourse neither
mitigates nor challenges the purificatory mandate of the modern Constitu-
tion. That mandate is, instead, strengthened. The re-vitalized purifica-
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tory mandate also leads philosophers to view themselves primarily in
terms of critique and denunciatioD. Those who live under the modern
Constitution see contamination everywhere. Their zeal becomes focused
on debunking, on seeking to overcome prejudices and superstitions. Such
missionary zeal abates, however, with the realization that we have never
been modern.
Nous n'entrons pas dans une nouveHe ~re; nous ne continuons plus la
fuite ~perdue des post-post-post-modemistes; nous oe nous
accrochons plus ~ I'avant-garde de I'avant:·garde; nous ne cherchons
plus 8 ~tre encore plus maHns, encore plus critiques, acreuser encore
un peu davantage I'~re du soup~on (69).
Postmodernists do signal an important change, however. Their
presence marks the termination of a particular way of thinking, a way
which sought always to move beyond the past.
Loin d'~tre le fin du fin, ils marquent la fin des fins, c'est-~-dire la fin
des fa~ons de finir et de passer qui faisaient se sucreder tt une vitesse
toujours plus veniginieuse des critiques toujours plus radicales et plus
r~volutionnaires (83-84).
The great irony here is that engaging in more radical and more
revolutionary critiques is a thoroughly modern enterprise.
Postmodernism's tendency to extend criticism to the very roots of
philosophy, its claim that we have entered a new post-Philosophical
epoch, are sure signs that it remains loyal to the modern Constitution.
Regardless of its influence in departments of literature, "Ie
postmodernisme est un symptOme et non pas une solution fraiche" (68).
How are to judge Latour's analysis? Surely those inclined to
favor the likes of Derrida, Rorly, Lyotard, and Baudrillard will object that
Latour has not painted postmodernism with a fine brush. Instead he has
used a large brush that eliminates nuances and differences. He has, they
will complain, first painted a caricature , and then criticized it.
While this may be true, he has at least challenged philosophers
to re-think the nature of their discipline away from the model of
denunciationand critique which does dominate much postmodernwriting.
Here, in spite of the caricatures of postmoderism, is achallenge to be
laken seriously as philosophy looks for ways to define itself in the twenty-
first century.
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Other critics of Latour might want to ask whether he has done
anything more than exemplify the general claim that no era is either fully
self-conscious or consistent? Could we not say that the medievals were
not really medieval nor the Romantics really Romantic in the sense
Latour intends by his thesis? Is it not the case that every epoch reveals
a gap between its Constitution and its practice? In a sense the answer is
yes. Bach epoch has its unspoken, unchaUenged assumptions which later
historians bring to light. Latour, however, wishes to undertake a different
project.
Tbe gap he identifies between theory and practice is not focused
on identifying unrecognized presuppositions of the past. His more impo-
rtant aim is to encourage us to reconsider the very way in which we unde-
rstand time and history. Admitting that we have never been modern pro-
vides a more generous way of dealing with the past No longer need we
make a fetish out of being more radical or more critical. Modernity, as
Latour put it, tended toward "la r6duction de retre au novum" (100). Our
very identity depended on marking ourselves off from our predecessors.
Once we realize that we have never been modern, we can view
time, not as a line, but as a circle expanding in every direction. Such a
view eliminates the oscillation between the extremes of radical novelty
and eternal return. "Le pass6 n'est pas d6pass6, mais repris, r6p6t6,
entour6, prot6g6, recombin6, r6interpr6t6 et refait" (102) Our activities
remain what they have always been, not modern, but "polytemporal."
This more bountiful way of interpreting time allows us to engage in
constructive and synthetic work without having to identify radical
beginnings, our own or anyone else's.
Latour seems particularly on target here. One dominating
metaphor of modernity was that of the tabula rasa, what we might caU
the myth of the completely fresh start. Descartes announced it in his
Discourse. Bacon proposed it via the propadeutic ofeliminating the "four
idols." Locke made it a centerpiece ofepistemology. Politically, the fable
of the state of nature was an attempt to clear away obstacles to reform
by recreating a fictional, pristine realm. When Freud came up with his
Oedipus Complex, what sounded like a breakthrough in the understan-
ding of the human psyche was nothing but the crystallization of an
attitude that had been prominent throughout modernity: the only way to
establish ourselves as special involves killing off the father, making a
clean break with our ancestor.
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Latour's analysis is helpful in orienting ourselves toward a central
ontological question that underlies this mythos of modernity: the
particular understanding of time which opens into a defmition of being
in terms of novelty. We recover our sense of being non-modern or a-
modern wben we see ourselves as "polytemporal." There is no need to
preserve tbe false dicbotomy of modernity, either the embrace of sheer
novelty wbicb leads to constant critique and denunciation, or an
antiquarianism which seeks to re-create the past.
We should, instead, see ourselves as what we are, what we have
always been, "des ~changeurset des brasseurs de temps" (103). The real
question is never how we should break with the past nor how we should
recapture its greatness. It is always how we should tinker with our own
era, patching it together as a combination of tradition and novelty.
The challenge of the 21st century then becomes not so much the
ever more zealous desire to overcome and break with the past. It is,
rather, the attempt to live fully in the present by re-establishing our
condition as non-modern, aligning our intellectual convictions witb our
practices.
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